History

Early capability systems

Capability systems emerged in early computer systems as a way to represent and protect authority: possession of a protected reference determines what an operation may access.

For
All audiences, especially policy, industry and research
Last reviewed
2026-08-05
Review cycle
Review every 6 months

Why it matters

The earlier work shows that capability security is a long-developed model, while CHERI’s contribution is a contemporary, compatible hardware-software realisation.

In brief

Capability systems emerged in early computer systems as a way to represent and protect authority: possession of a protected reference determines what an operation may access. CHERI adapts that lineage to modern processors and existing software ecosystems.

Key considerations

1. Protected references

Authority is carried by references that untrusted software cannot arbitrarily forge.

2. Least authority

Software receives the objects and operations it needs instead of broad ambient access.

3. Practical adaptation

Modern systems must combine these principles with virtual memory, C/C++, concurrency and current processor constraints.

Evidence and caveats

Historical systems differ greatly from CHERI in architecture, workload and implementation. Use the comparison to understand principles, not to imply equivalence.

Use dated primary project, funder and provider records. Separate what was planned, demonstrated and subsequently delivered.

Primary routes

Where next

Continue to the CHERI development history to see how the principles were adapted and tested.

See the modern adaptation